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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDWARD HAROLD SCHAD, JR., 
Petitioner, 
-vs- Case No. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden Utah 12485 
State Prison, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial 
court denying petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Peitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court denying his Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 7 :30 p.m. on July 5, 1968, Lynda Lea Olson 
discovered the nude body of her brother, Clare OdeJl 
.Mortensen, in a closet in his apartment on the lower 
AYenues in Salt Lake City, (T 112). The decedent's 
hands were bound behind his back with leather thongs 
and small diameter nylon cords which were tied rather 
loosely and with simple overhand knots (T 118, 419). 
The ankles were also bound ( T 155), and two pieces of 
cloth had been tied around the face and neck ( T 157, 
403) . At the time the body was found the front door 
of the apartment was locked ( T 148), but the back door 
was ajar ( T 105). 
A post-mortem examination disclosed that the de-
cedent had engaged in both active and passive anal 
sodomy (T 405, 417), as well as fellatio (T 416) near 
the time of death. Bmises and scratches were found on 
the knees and legs of the deceased and there were 
superficial abrasions on the penis and scrotum ( T 405). 
Dr. James T. Weston, the medical examiner who per-
formed the autopsy, testified that the cause of death 
was restricted venous return of blood from the brain 
caused by the ligature placed about the decedent's neck 
( T 408). Dr. Weston testified, however, that the liga-
ture was not tight enough to impair the supply of blood 
to the brain ( T 431). From this, Dr. Weston concluded 
that the purpose of the ligatures had been to heighten 
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erotic stimulus during au act of sodomy immediately 
prior to death ( T 439, 655), and that the death had 
been accidental ( T 494). The time of death was fixed 
between noon and 10 :00 p.m. July 4, 1968 ( T 409) . 
It was shown at trial that the decedent had for a 
long period of time engaged in acts of anal sodomy 
( T 405). In addition, he had suffered from paralysis 
( T 162), which was attributed to a tumor found in the 
decedent's brain (T 439). There was testimony that 
the decedent had experienced frequent dizzy spells 
( T 172) and had constantly used a variety of prescrip-
tion drugs for his various physical ailments ( T 96, 172) . 
Dr. Weston testified that the drugs and the tumor could 
have contributed to the cause of death {T 435, 442). 
Appellant had been seen in the company of de-
cedent at 11 :30 p.m. on July 3, 1968 ( T 89) . A neigh-
bor testified that she had talked with appellant outside 
decedent's home at 9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T 184), but 
had not seen appellant enter or leave the decedent's res-
idence at that time {T 226). Another neighbor testified 
that he had seen appellant replacing a window screen 
outside the decedent's apartment at 8:15 a.m. on July 5 
( T 209). Appellant testified that he left Ft. Lewis, 
Washington on July 1, 1968, and arrived in Salt Lake 
City at 4 :45 a.m. on July 3 ( T 470, 472). Upon his ar-
rival he went to a cafe, where he met the decedent 
( T 47 4), who invited appellant to stay at his apartment 
( T 47 5) . Appellant accepted, and followed decedent 
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to the apartment at 6 :00 a.m. on July 3 (T 477). There-
after, he accompanied decedent to a loeal tavern, a 
friend's house, and another tavern, returning to the 
apartment at 3:00 p.m. (T 518, 519). At about 4:45 
p.m., the two again left the apartment and visited two 
taverns ( T 520, 522) . Decedent left appellant alone at 
midnight ( T 522) and appellant accompanied three 
other persons on a trip to the Great Salt Lake ( T 289, 
5254). Returning at 6 :00 a.m. on July 4, appellant went 
again to a tavern (T 527) where appellant testified that 
the decedent carried on an intimate conversation with a 
heavy-set man (T 530). The two invited appellant to 
attend a rodeo with them, but appellant declined (T 
531). The decedent then took appellant to another tav-
ern and left him there at 12 :30 p.m., after which ap-
pellant testified he never saw the decedent (T 531). 
Appellant left the tavern at 9:00 p.m. on July 4, 
and walked to the decedent's apartment (T 533), 
where he talked with the neighbor and picked up his 
belongings from the back porch of the decedent's 
apartment (T 536). He denied returning to the apart-
ment and replacing a window screen on the morning of 
July 5 ( T 621 ) , and the evidence in di ca ted that the 
neighbor might well have been mistaken as to the de-
scription of the person who replaced the screen ( T 467-
8). 
It was shown at trial that appellant had pur-
ch::i sed an airplane ticket to Germany ( T 273) , and that 
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he had used a credit card belonging to the decedent to 
obtain money with which to purchase the ticket ( T 279) . 
Appellant admitted having used the credit card unlaw-
fully ( T 623), and testified that he found it in the 
pocket of a shirt which he had loaned decedent and 
which decedent had returned ( T 616). There was also 
testimony that appellant had discarded certain items of 
the decedent's personal property at a motel where he 
stayed on July 4 (T 246, 250), but appellant denied 
this ( T 543). 
Appellant left Salt Lake City for Germany at 
10 :30 p.m. on July 5 ( T 308), and was arrested by the 
military authorities in Hauau, Germany, at 11 :30 a.m. 
on July 8, for being absent without leave (T 336). At 
the request of the American military authorities, the 
German Police recovered appellant's two suitcases and 
turned them over to the military approximately one hour 
after appellant's arrest (T 33). The suitcases and other 
items taken from appellant were then mailed to the 
United States Army Criminal Investigator at Fort 
Douglas, Utah ( T 353), and were opened by a Salt 
Lake City Police Officer (T 537). Certain items of 
evidence taken from the suitcases, as well as the suit-
cases themselves, were admitted in evidence at appel-
lant's trial over the objection of defense counsel (T 
341). 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court with-
drew from the jury's consideration the charge of mur-
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der in the first degree ( T 690) . In its instruction to the 
jury the court charged that appellant could be found 
guilty of murder in the second degree if the jury be-
lieved that the killing of the decedent was committed 
by the appellant during the perpetration of an act of 
sodomy by appellant with the decedent (T 697, R 40). 
Timely exception was taken to this instruction ( T 776-
777). The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder 
in the second degree (R 29). Appellant's motion for a 
new trial ( T 778, 785) was denied ( T 795) . 
ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT A 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE 
APPELLANT'S S U IT CA SE S AND THE 
ITEMS CONTAINED THEREIN BY THE 
GERMAN POLICE, THE U.S. ARMY, AND 
THE SALT LAKE CITY POLICE WERE UN-
LAvVFUL UNDER THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE ADMISSION INTO 
EVIDENCE AT PETITIONER'S TRIAL OF' 
SUCH ITEMS SEIZED D UR I N G THE 
SEARCH WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR RE· 
QUIRING REVERSAL. 
The law is well settled that a search made by of· 
ficial authorities will be reasonable under the Fourth 
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Amendment only under one of the following three cir-
cumstances : 
( 1) Pursuant to search warrant. Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
( 1964) 
(2) Incident to a lawful arrest. Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23 10 L.Ed.2d 726 
( 1963) 
( 3) With the consent of the owner of the 
place or item searched. Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483, 11 L.Ed.ld 856 
(1964). 
In the case at bar, the search made by officer Wesley 
was admittedly made without a search warrant and 
without the consent of appellant. Indeed no warrant or 
official order was issued, even in Germany, by the 
United States military authorities which directed the 
seizure of the evidence in question. Accordingly, the 
search of appellant's suitcases and the use of items tak-
en therefrom in evidence against appellant at trial were 
justified only if made incident to a lawful arrest. 
Clearly, however, such was not the case. In a recent de-
cision, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 89 S.Ct. 
2034 ( 1969), the United States Supreme Court 
examined the purpose of the rule permitting a search 
incident to a lawful arrest, and noted that the rule was 
one of necessity to prevent: 
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(a) The destruction of evidence by the person 
arrested ; and 
(b) the danger to police officer inherent in a 
situation where the person arrested might be 
armed, and therefore potentially a threat to the 
safety of the officer. 
Since these two functions may be completely satisfied 
by a search limited to the arrested person's body and 
the area within his immediate control, the court in Chimel 
declared that searches incident to a lawful arrest are 
valid only if they do not extend beyond that area. 
A search is "incident" to an arrest only if it is 
reasonably contemporaneous therewith. In Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881 (1964), one 
of the major cases relied on by the court as authority 
for Chimel, the court disallowed a search of the 
defendant's car as incidental to arrest, because the search 
took place when the defendant was already in jail and 
the car was in custody in the police garage. In this case 
the Supreme Court laid down the standards for search 
incidental to arrest that were reiterated in Chimel, snpra. 
The court reversed stating: 
"But these justifications are absent where a 
search is remote in time or place from the ar-
rest." Id at :367. 
In fallowing Preston the 10th Circuit reversed in 
Welch v. United States, 411 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1969), 
stating "In order for a search incident to an arrest to be 
reasonable, it must be contemporaneous both in time and 
in place with the arrest." In Faubion v. United States, 
424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970), another 10th Circuit case, 
the defendant, while in transportation from one state to 
another, stopped the officers and after being advised 
of his rights told them that two hand guns were 
in his suitcase which the authorities had in custody. The 
authorities then searched the suitcase without a warrant, 
the evidence was introduced and the case was reversed 
for that reason. 
The reason for the Preston-Chimel standard is 
to limit search incident to arrest to its position as an 
exigency to be used only when it is unreasonable to re-
quire a search w a r r a n t . In the case at hand 
the seizure by German a u t h o r i t i e s took place 
one hour after appellant's arrest, and the search by the 
Salt Lake City authorities occurred several days there-
after. Thus, both the seizure and search of the suitcases 
were in no way sufficiently close in time to appellant's 
arrest to be deemed "incident" thereto, and therefore 
cannot be justified on that ground. This, coupled with 
the fact that the suitcases were far beyond appellant's 
access and control at the time of the seizure and search, 
required that the authorities obtain either a search war-
rant or appellant's consent before proceeding with the 
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search. The record is clear that they did neither. As a 
result, the seizure of the suitcases by German police at 
the request of United States Army authorities, and the 
search by Salt Lake City Police Officials was not a 
lawful search under the United States Constitution. 
In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d 
171 ( 1964) the Supreme Court held that a conviction 
in which illegally seized evidence had been produced at 
trial must be overturned unless the effect of the intro-
duced evidence could be declared "harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." This is in keeping with the common 
law rule of shifting the burden to the one admitting the 
prejudicial error ( l Wigmore, Evidence § 21 3rd ed. 
1940). 
Three years later the Supreme Court reiterated 
this position of placing of the burden on the prosecu-
tion in cases of constitutional error. "Before a fed-
eral constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. State of Cali-
fornia, 386, U.S. 125, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). 
The following circuits have all granted habeas corpus 
for constitutional error quoting the above language of 
Chapman: 
2nd Circuit Savino v. Follettee, Warden 
305 F. Supp. 277 ( S.D. 
N.Y. 1969) 
3rd Circuit 
5th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
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Ordog v. Yeager, Warden 
299 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 
1969) 
Brown v. Heyd, Sheriff 
277 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.La. 
1967) 
Imbler v. Craven, Warden 
298 F. Supp. 795 ( C.D. 
Cal. 1969) 
The following circuits have all granted habeas 
corpus for constitutional error on authority of Fahy be-
fore Chapman. 
4th Circuit 
7th Circuit 
8th Circuit 
Banks v. Pepersack, Warden 
244 F. Supp. 675 (D. Md. 
1965) 
Schmitt v. Burke, Warden 
277 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. 
Wis. 1967) 
Craig v. Haugh, Warden 
242 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. 
Iowa 1965) 
In Fahy, supra, the courts said, 
"The question is whether there is a reas-
onable possibility that the evidence complained 
of might have contributed to the conviction." 
In State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639 24 Utah2d 202 
( 1970) on the issue of introduction of illegally obtained 
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evidence, the Utah Court citing Chapman stated "there 
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial." The 
court further stated in Scarulrett, which was a trial to 
a judge, that a jury may be more readily prejudiced 
by improper evidence than a trial judge. 
It would appear impossible to say that the intro-
duction of the only physical evidence linking the de-
fendant to the deceased did not have the effect, in the 
words of Chief Justice 'iV arren, of "forging another 
link between the accused and the crime charged." Fahy 
supra. Thus it harly seems feasible in this case based 
upon circumstancial evidence ( T 712) and tried before 
a jury that the introduction of this evidence either with 
or without the resulting necessity of the defendant in 
explaining his possession of it ( T 569-570) coupled 
with the prosecutor's use of the defendant's explanation 
of his possession of these items ( T 729) could be 
deemed "harmless beyond a resonable doubt" and found 
not to "have contributed to the conviction. Fahy, supra. 
For this reason, the conviction should be reversed. 
POINT B 
DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY :MADE IM-
PROPER INQUIRIES BEFORE THE JURY 
WHILE CROSS-EXAMINING DEFENDANT 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CON-
VICTIONS (T 545-548). SUCH QUESTIONING 
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UNJUSTLY PREJUDICED PETITIONER'S 
POSITION REQUIRING RETRIAL. 
The Utah view is that a defendant can be ques-
tioned concerning past felony convictions as to the num-
ber and type of crime involved. State v. H ougensen, 91 
Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), State v. Dickson, 12 
Utah-2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 ( 1961). The prosecution clear-
ly exceed permissible examination on three fronts. 
( 1) Prosecution counsel's questions on cross, 
over defense counsels objection, concerning petitioners 
prior discharge from the service ( T 545) were neither 
probative or relevant, particularly where the defendant 
was evidently of sufficient character that he was pres-
ently in the service and had been there for almost two 
years. 
( 2) The repeated questioning of petitioner over 
defense counsels objections as to the time and place of 
the admitted convictions, .- T 545-56-471 N/?r{ 
( 3) the prosecution's questioning of the petitioner 
at some length concerning the illegal wearing of a 
United States Army uniform, a fact neither shown to 
be true or shown to be a felony, clearly went beyond 
allowable questioning concerning felony convictions. 
( T. 547) 
In regard to these lines of question, none of the in-
formation pursued was of probative value nor is it rele-
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vant. In speaking of the questions concerning the al-
leged illegal wearing of an army uniform, the trial court 
in a memorandum denying this Habeas Corpus stated, 
"such an offense has no relation to murder 
amidst sex perversion P 21. " 
This questioning was pursued to emphasize to 
the jury that defendant had had past trouble. This testi-
mony cast aspersions upon the defendant and implied 
that because he had possibly been in trouble else-
where, he was a person of evil character. As such, its 
effect was to disgrace the defendant and show a pro-
pensity to commit crime; a method of jury persuasion 
not allowed. I Warton's Criminal Evidence, Sec 233, 
(12th Ed. 1955). 
From State v. Dickson, supra, 
The very purpose of excluding such evidence 
is to prevent the prosecution from smearing an 
accused by showing a bad reputation and rely-
ing on that for conviction rather than being re-
quired to produce adequate proof of the crime 
in question, 12 Utah2d, at 12, 361 P.2d at 414. 
As in Dickson, supra, the admission of such evidence is 
of such prejudicial effect as to necessitate retrail. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that petitioner was prejudiced by the ad-
15 
m1ss1on of the unlawfully obtained evidence and the 
questioning concerning his past this Court should grant 
his Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID P. RHODE 
